When Do Leaders Evade Term Limits?

• In Event: Democratic Backsliding and Challenges of Regime Transitions

Abstract

Term limits constitute a key check on executive power, yet many incumbents manage
to manipulate or evade these constraints. This article documents the ways in which democratic and authoritarian leaders try to overstay their terms and the conditions under which leaders make attempts to evade or change term limits. We argue that the existence of strong opposition parties in the legislature serve as an effective deterrent against successful evasion attempts. Using an original global dataset of all term limit evasion attempts from 1990 to 2018, we trace the strategies of 234 leaders in 106 countries. The data shows that about half of all leaders attempt to overstay their term, but importantly — they do so via constitutional methods. Very few incumbents outright ignore the constitution and most pursue amendments in order to prolong their tenure. We also find empirical evidence that strong opposition parties check leaders' attempts to expand presidential power.

Authors

• Anne Meng, University of Virginia

• Mila Versteeg, University of Virginia