The Electoral Logic of Foreign-Imposed Democracy

• In Event: Great Power Overreach and Retrenchment: Implementing Grand Strategic Choices

Abstract

Liberal democracies have frequently intervened in foreign states to impose new leaders or regimes. Yet, the goals and strategies of these interventions have varied. During some regime changing interventions, liberal democracies have sought to build and support democratic political institutions in the targeted state. In others, democratic interveners have installed new leaders, without seeking to democratize the wider political institutions of the state. This paper develops an argument explaining why liberal democracies such as the United States have sought to impose democracy during some regime changing interventions, but not others. When a democratic intervener anticipates that potential leadership candidates aligned with its foreign policy goals can win an electoral majority, the benefits of installing a democracy may outweigh the benefits of installing an authoritarian regime. The paper assesses this argument through a paired case study of two U.S. interventions during the Cold War: Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican
Republic in 1965.

Author

• Jonathan Monten, University College London