Trafficking in Paradise: Why Governments Allow Illegal Firearms in Island Nations

• In Event: Subnational Politics of Responses to Illicit Trafficking and Criminal Violence

Abstract

Transnational illicit markets can generate harmful spillovers across their trafficking routes, but governments do not always take action to confront illicit markets, presenting an important policy problem. This article helps explain the puzzle of government inaction in the face of illicit markets. While the conventional wisdom is that developing states lack the resources to
crack down on these markets, I argue that governments often lack the incentive to crack down. The costs of harboring illicit markets, from violence to weakened governance, are often high. They are not, however, evenly distributed, even within a state. Instead these costs are often borne by relatively weak political actors, including the urban and rural poor. Government officials, then, often face little political pressure to counter illicit markets. In addition, governments often benefit from illicit markets thanks to payoffs or patronage for political supporters. I argue that only when concentrated costs for political supporters outweigh illicit gains by the government does a state, on its own, seek to rein in an illicit market. Furthermore, governments of developing states only turn to international assistance when they want to fend off illicit markets but cannot do so themselves or when donor states have high levels of political leverage over the developing state. The interaction between the distribution of spillovers, the government’s access to illicit gains, and foreign pressure form the government’s incentives to allow an illicit market. I examine my argument through within and between case and cross-regional comparisons of government responses to firearms trafficking in Jamaica, Grenada, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea. I assess original evidence from elite-level interviews and subnational data including seizures of illicit goods and spillovers such as gun violence. This paper contributes to the intersection of conflict studies and political economy by investigating the variance in anti-illicit market assistance provided and state governance of illicit markets. As states and intergovernmental organizations attempt to manage the repercussions of illicit firearms, we need a clearer understanding of the conditions under which governments allow these illicit markets.

Author

• Lauren Pinson, University of Texas at Dallas