Violation of Bright-Lines, Term Limit Evasion and Information Control

• In Event: Panel II on Democratic Backsliding/Erosion

Abstract

Important theories of self-enforcing democracy suggest that highly visible constitutional “bright lines,” such as term limits, represent an important guard rail against democratic erosion. When these bright lines are violated, they are assumed to provide a focal point for the opposition to mount coordinated challenges to would-be dictators. Term limit evasion, the circumvention of constitutional restrictions on the maximum length of terms the head of state may serve, is one of the clearest and most frequent political events violating bright lines. However, empirical patterns show that anti-government movements were not more likely to increase after term limit evasion, which is at odds with the literature. I argue that this pattern can be explained by incentives of leaders to repress potential mass mobilization, controlling media and the free flow of information after term limit evasion. Using TSCS analysis and the automated text analysis of newspapers in multiple countries, I provide macro- and micro-level empirical supports about this claim.

Author

• JunHyeok Jang, University of California, Merced