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This paper explores the process of ideological change within terror groups, specifically exploring how and why groups become more secular or more religious. Challenging existing depictions of groups as possessing static “secular” or “religious” ideologies, it asks the following questions: How and why do terror groups undergo processes of religionization / secularization? What factors promote or forestall such changes and why?
Despite extensive research which has analyzed differences between secular and religious terrorism, studies have tended to be overwhelmingly static – portraying groups as holding a steadfast unchanging ideological position and focusing on the outcomes of this agenda. Furthermore, while groups holding religious agendas have been shown to be deadlier and broadly more violent compared to secular terror groups, the process whereby groups become religious (or secular) has remained surprisingly understudied. Recognizing that religiosity – just as any other ideological construct – can be adopted to greater or lesser extents over time, I draw on social movement theory’s frame analysis in order to conceptualize a spectrum that reflects how dominant religion is in a group’s diagnosing of the situation, prognosing of the solution, and motivation for action. Utilizing this spectrum, analysis consists of a paired comparison of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Hamas. Utilizing their communiques and leaflets, increases or decreases in both groups’ religiosity is analyzed in response to shifts in repression, international / regional certification, internal competition among groups, and regional political realignments, tracing how such developments influence group religiosity.
The results show that group religiosity should be understood as a dynamic rather than static construct, increasing and decreasing within group perceptions in response to emerging political change. Furthermore, and somewhat contrary to expectations, the more religiously-inclined Hamas showed higher sensitivity to such developments, shifting more extensively between secular and religious perceptions compared the secular-inclined PLO. The study concludes by extrapolating this type of dynamic prism to other contexts, demonstrating how conflict dynamics may influence other ideological positions of terror groups as well.