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How does liberal international institutions' inclusion of authoritarian member states affect their efficacy? While international institutions' inclusion of non-democracies is often seen as mechanism for promoting democratization and the spread of liberal values, we argue that international institutions' inclusion of states with weak democratic credentials risks undermining their credibility in democratic member states. As a result, these institutions become less valuable allies for domestic actors seeking to promote reforms. We evaluate this expectation in the context of the European Court of European Human Rights, where rotation in panel composition provides exogenous variation in whether a judge appointed from an authoritarian state sits on cases brought against democratic members. We show that judgments rendered by panels including judges appointed from authoritarian states are complied with at a slower rate than judgments rendered by panels where all judges are appointed from democracies.