Great Expectations: A Reference-Dependent Theory of Reassurance

• In Event: Identity and Foreign Policy Behavior

Abstract

When are reassurance signals more credible and hence more effective in getting an ally or adversary to comply with the sender’s request or believe in the sender’s lack of malign intentions? Drawing on insights from behavioral economics and social psychology, I propose a reference-dependent theory of interpreting assurance. I argue that the perceived credibility of assurance signals depends on both the costliness of the signals and the receiver's expectations. I test my theory using original survey-experimental data, as well as American, Chinese, and Soviet archival materials on the cases of Sino-Soviet Split and Sino-U.S. Rapprochement. My findings suggest that, counterintuitively, if adversaries generally hold lower expectations regarding the sender's behavior and allies hold higher expectations, similar reassurance signals can be more effective with adversaries by pleasantly surprising them, and less effective or even counterproductive with allies, because higher expectations create greater disappointment. Moreover, in repeated interactions, earlier successful assurance signals can make it harder for later assurance signals to be perceived as costly because the earlier ones raised the receiver's expectations.

Author

• Zenobia Chan, Princeton University