Bounded Democratization: How and Why Militaries Influence Democratization

• In Event: Civilian-Military Relations, Authoritarian Regime Durability and Democratization

Abstract

Militaries hold immense coercive power and can potentially shed civilian restraints. This an especially salient factor in authoritarian regimes, where militaries who have come to power can refuse to yield to civilians and uphold authoritarian rule. Why then, do some militaries in authoritarian regimes cede power to civilians and accept the prospect of democratization? I argue that militaries in authoritarian regimes require credible commitments that their core interests will be protected under democracy. Civilians provide credible commitments when there is an institutionalized party in the regime who's interests converge with the military's. When these commitments are unavailable, or weak, the uncertainty pushes militaries to seek to set the parameters of democracy, or what I call bounded democratization. I test this theory using a new dataset of post-military authoritarian regimes following WWII. I also provide qualitative analysis of the theoretical mechanisms with evidence from Indonesia and Paraguay.

Author

• Darin Self, Cornell University