Accountability Trade-offs of Russian Mayors

• In Event: Subnational Officials and Subnational Development in Contemporary Russia

Abstract

This paper exploits variation in selection procedures at both regional and local levels of administration in contemporary Russia to explain heterogeneity in policy outcomes at the local level. Based on a theory of career concerns and using new data on approximately 500 Russian cities for the period from 2011 to 2018, it explores the relationships between subnational executive officials and how the responsiveness of local officials impacts local development. The paper uses difference-in-differences design to test how the transition between elected and appointed procedures at both regional and local levels over time influenced the efficiency of the local officials. It measures the efficiency of local executives using originally collected municipal level budget data and public procurement data. The combination of budget data and detailed information on public procurement allows me to characterize the outcome in terms of three components: how much the local executives spend, how efficiently they spend, and who benefits from contracting with them. As opposed to the conventional argument in the literature that elections incentivize officials to be more efficient and provide more resources to the local population, this study argues that in certain conditions elections can intensify inefficiency and favoritism, and that appointed executives may have more incentives to be efficient.

Author

• Olga Gasparyan, Hertie School