Presidential ‘Pitches’ and White House Pressure

• In Event: The Bully Pulpit: Presidential Communication in an Uncertain Landscape

Abstract

Bargaining is a critical component to exercising shared lawmaking powers. Conventional wisdom holds that presidents are effective at personally persuading members of Congress to support favored legislation, but recent scholarship shows when and how they get involved matters. Yet, we know less about specifically how presidents bargain with members of Congress and which types of inter-personal presidential communication frames on to members of Congress work best. Using unique and recently uncovered data from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library concerning the White House’s press for passage of the 1983 budget, this paper addresses how presidents position their legislative pitches and to which members. We specifically ask how presidential political leverage through elections, appeals to party unity, and a call for bipartisanship helps persuade members of Congress to side with the White House. This approach and these data provide a unique window into this “informal” bargaining arrangement and allows us to understand how presidents communicate to members of Congress.

Authors

• Isaiah Christopher Johnson, University of Houston

• Brandon Rottinghaus, University of Houston