The Effect of Interest Group Strategies on Parliamentarians’ Behaviour

• In Event: Legislative Speech

Abstract

It is widely acknowledged that interest groups seek to influence public policy by lobbying legislators. Despite the normative and real-world implications of having interest groups shape what legislators do, we lack a clear understanding of whether interest groups’ efforts are effective in shaping legislators’ actual behaviour. In this paper, we argue that the level of engagement by an interest group, and the mode of engagement, shapes legislators’ responsiveness to interest group demands. To test this argument, we take advantage of uniquely nuanced data provided by the Irish case which allows us to link detailed information on 212,638 single lobbying instruments targeting individual members of the Irish Parliament to 769,569 questions tabled by members. The results provide some of the clearest evidence yet of a relationship between interest group activity and legislative behaviour. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of legislative behaviour and the legitimacy of representative democracy.

Author

• Oliver Huwyler