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Although third-party governments frequently engage in intense forms of military cooperation with foreign militant groups, conventional explanations of alliance formation have exclusively focused on interactions between sovereign states. Evidence suggests that foreign militant groups and governments make costly state-like commitments, including integrating command structures and conducting joint military operations, providing partners access to their military infrastructure, and exchanging advanced weapons technologies, training, logistical support, and intelligence. This article seeks to establish a new research agenda focused on elucidating the trends in alliance commitments between governments and foreign militant groups. I argue that, although state-foreign militant alliances differ from state-state alliances in terms of formalization, they are substantively similar in terms of the types of commitments that partners make to each other, the levels to which partners institutionalize their obligations, and the costs partners bear when forming their alliance. As such, state-foreign militant alliances have similar effects on partners’ and adversaries’ behaviors as written-down agreements between states. To compare the diversity and intensity of state-state and state-foreign militant alliances, I draw from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) events data set, which consists of all dyadic interactions between various actors from 1995-2017. I find that, on average, state and foreign militant partners engage in more intense forms of security cooperation than state-state dyads. They also more frequently form joint commands, carry out joint attacks, and provide each other military aid. Drawing from my findings, I highlight several avenues for future research.