Inherited Interventions: Democratic Decision-Making and Military Deference

• In Event: Militaries and Democratic Process

Abstract

Why do some newly elected democratic leaders intensify involvement in ongoing military interventions? Several studies suggest changes in political leadership or winning coalitions liberate newly installed decision-makers from the domestic punishment their more culpable predecessors would expect to suffer from a military defeat or less favorable negotiated settlement. Yet several U.S. presidents -- from Richard Nixon in Vietnam to Donald Trump in Afghanistan today -- have opted to intensify American involvement in interventions they inherit even after campaigning to wind down these wars. I argue that newly inaugurated political leaders, particularly those with little combat experience, will defer to the preferences of senior military officers to avoid the political risks of defying military advice early in their tenure. Given the well-established preferences of uniformed officers to intensify fighting in pursuit of victory, presidents will prolong ongoing interventions to avoid domestic political risks of dissent from the military's ranks, even at the expense of their own preferences. I evaluate my argument using Bayesian process tracing methods and comparative case studies of the wartime decisions of President Eisenhower in Korea, President Nixon in Vietnam, and Presidents Obama and Trump in Afghanistan early in their first terms.

Author

• Theo Milonopoulos, Columbia University