Public Support for Abrogating Alliance Agreements: An Experimental Evidence

• In Event: The Public and Conflict Dynamics

Abstract

Under what conditions will countries decide to violate alliance commitments in war? The institutional model expects allies to fulfill their promise unless there have changes in power between the allies, changes in institutions, or the allies are autocratic. We propose the cost and benefit model which expects allies to calculate the expected costs of fulfilling their promise. When those costs are high, then allies find a way out. Using original survey experiments conducted in the United States, we evaluate the cost and benefit model. We find that public support for abandoning allies increased and the public’s concerns about reputational damage decreased if the public informed the public of low possibility of military triumph even with US involvement, heavy US military casualties or the option of UN mediation. Our experiment also revealed that the imposition of economic sanctions and the president’s indication of destructive influence on economy failed to reduce the audience costs and the public’s concerns about reputational damage. Overall, our experimental findings show support for the cost and benefit model.

Authors

• Mark Souva, Florida State University

• Kai Quek, University of Hong Kong

• Weifang Xu, Florida State University