Civil War, Territorial Change, and Violence Against Civilians

• In Event: Mapping the Presence and Relationships of Non-State Armed Groups

Abstract

How do changes in control of territory during civil conflicts influence combatants’ incentives to victimize civilians? Existing research, such as the influential work of Kalyvas (2006), finds that such violence is most common where combatants exercise incomplete control. Less well understood is how changes in control create incentives to attack civilians. We theorize that loss of territory dampens short-run incentives to engage in such attacks. Attacking civilians is costly, as it diverts military resources from the battlefield and reduces civilians’ willingness to cooperate with and provide intelligence to combatants. Such support should be particularly valuable after loss of territory. Changes in control of territory also leads some civilians to seek protection. Civilians may demand evacuation or humanitarian assistance. This imposes logistical, political, and humanitarian cost on the combatant that loses territory. We further suggest that this incentive to refrain from attacking civilians after loss of territory should be stronger for government than rebel forces. Precisely because government forces have more resources than rebels, they are in a better position to exploit intelligence and provide protection to civilians. We test this theory with new data that measures changes in control after battles in thirteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We address the potential endogeneity between battles and violence against civilians by exploiting randomness in weather conditions when battles occur. Poor weather—rain and fog—permit rebels to ambush conventional forces and gain control of territory. We use poor weather as an instrument for shifts in territorial control after battle events. Results are consistent with our theory—seizure of territory by rebels leads to less government violence, but has no discernible relationship to rebel violence.

Authors

• James Igoe Walsh, University of North Carolina, Charlotte

• Jacob Aronson, University of Maryland, College Park

• Michael Findley, University of Texas, Austin

• Kyosuke Kikuta, Japan External Trade Organization