Turf War or Alliance: Gun Control and Power Shocks Among Chicago Criminal Gangs

• In Event: Mapping the Presence and Relationships of Non-State Armed Groups

Abstract

Bloody turf wars and cycles of violent retribution dominate reports on the relationships among gangs. However, these organized criminal groups also form truces, alliances and other types of informal arrangements that allow them to peacefully coexist within their delimited territories, to not encroach upon each other’s turf, and to focus on business rather than on gang warfare. This paper proposes that gangs engage in turf war and violence following shocks to their relative coercive capacity. We look at one particular shock – access to firearms – to understand how changes in this input shapes gang violence in urban spaces. Our empirical strategy leverages exogenous changes to Chicago gangs’ access to firearms generated by deregulation of gun sales and ownership laws in neighboring states between 2010-2016. Relying on data from regional intelligence-sharing among county police departments, we map gang alliances across state lines to determine which gangs gained increased access to firearms through deregulation. Given Chicago’s illiquid gun market, regional weapon smuggling throughout gang networks represented a significant shock to the relative power of well-networked gangs. This paper has implications for literatures on organized crime, urban violence, gun control, and bargaining theory.

Authors

• Elena Barham, Columbia University

• Sarah Zukerman Daly, Columbia University