Expectations of Repression and Protest Behavior in Algeria

• In Event: Protest in Democracies and Autocracies: Crisis, Conflict, & Repression

Abstract

A growing literature examines how characteristics of the military, such as its professionalism or corporate interests, affect its willingness to repress mass uprisings. Far less is known about how the opposition assesses military loyalty. How do protesters decide whether the military will repress or defect in response to protests? We examine this question in real-time through a massive (N=9,000) online survey in Algeria during the 2019 protests. We find that respondents primed to think of corruption in the military, as well as the military’s ties to Russia, are more likely to anticipate repression. In contrast, those who believe the military is professional or who perceive splits between officers and soldiers are more likely to anticipate defection. These beliefs appear to shape behavior: respondents anticipating defection are more likely to have protested, and express greater willingness to keep protesting. These results suggest that protesters make strategic calculations about the likelihood of repression based on characteristics of the military.

Authors

• Sharan Grewal, College of William & Mary

• Matthew Cebul, US Institute of Peace