Time, Costly Diplomacy, and Signaling

• In Event: Credibility, Signaling, & Coercion

Abstract

Prominent theories in international relations portray diplomacy as “cheap talk,” costless behavior of limited signaling value. This perspective presents a puzzle: Why do busy leaders and other senior officials personally convey diplomatic messages that could be sent electronically or be delivered by a subordinate? To answer this question, I highlight a common but overlooked signaling behavior: time-costly diplomacy. Diplomacy can be time-intensive, and since time is especially scarce and valuable for senior officials, it is costly to escalate up the governmental hierarchy. As a result, when senior officials pay the time-costs to press their counterparts for policy concessions, it can send a credible signal of the former’s determination. Time-costly diplomacy is a workhorse signaling behavior in international politics. While oft-studied behaviors such as public threats and military mobilization may send stronger signals by tying hands or incurring great risk, this makes them appropriate only in rare moments of crisis. By contrast, time-costly diplomacy is quick to deploy, non-belligerent, and can be carried out in private, making it an available and easy-to-use signaling behavior in a wider variety of diplomatic contexts. I illustrate the logic and effects of time-costly diplomatic signaling with a case study of the George W. Bush administration's advocacy for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group and with a survey experimental design.

Author

• Michael Goldfien, Yale University