From Capture to Co-Governance: Paramilitary Influence in the Colombian Congress

• In Event: Public Goods Provision during War: Evidence from the Colombian Case

Abstract

How do armed actors intervene in the democratic process? Scholarship on criminal organizations suggests that armed groups seek to capture legislatures and executives in order to channel rents toward themselves and their allies. I argue that these theories understate the extent to which armed actors can manipulate democratic institutions to further their interests. Beyond capturing rents, armed groups with political agendas – including many insurgents, secessionists, and militias – can coerce or persuade elected officials to enact their policy platforms. This strategy, which I refer to as co-governance, presents a compelling opportunity for politically-motivated armed actors to implement their policy agendas without defeating and replacing the state.

I evaluate this argument in the context of the Colombian armed conflict. Throughout the 2000s, a coalition of paramilitary groups with a multifaceted political platform formed pacts with hundreds of local and national elected officials. To assess the political consequences of these pacts, I study the behavior of legislators in the Colombian Congress. I draw on data on bill sponsorship, voting records, and deliberations to assess whether and under what conditions paramilitary-affiliated legislators supported the paramilitaries’ political program. I leverage variation in the timing of pacts and exogenous shocks posed by public revelations of collusion for causal identification.

Author

• Andres Uribe, University of Chicago