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International nuclear export norms have become stringent over time through the cycle of normative change. The 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty lacks the authority to ban sensitive nuclear exports or impose comprehensive international monitoring. India’s 1974 nuclear test triggered a dispute over the adequacy of existing rules, which led to the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG restricted sensitive nuclear exports but failed to establish comprehensive monitoring requirement due to resistance from France and West Germany, which strove to make the norms as flexible as possible. When the 1991 Gulf War revealed that Iraq had managed to skirt the NSG’s rules, the inadequacy of the existing norms was illuminated again. This motivated the NSG to revise its rules, most importantly by establishing comprehensive monitoring. Drawing on Wayne Sandholtz’s theory of normative change, which argues that events trigger disputes and discussions, and that outcomes of these arguments modify norms, this study explains how international nuclear export control norms have evolved. Relying on both secondary and archival materials, the analysis demonstrates that two crucial events, the 1974 India nuclear test and the 1991 discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear weapons program, triggered the strengthening of international nuclear export control norms.