Natural Resource Revenue, Disgruntled Bureaucrats, and Taxpayer Accountability

• In Event: Frontiers of Research on Bureaucratic Politics and Management Mini-Conference: Patronage

Abstract

Much of the literature on natural resource governance suggests that state oil revenue makes governments less responsive to their taxpayers. To what extent do bureaucrats contribute to this severed government-taxpayer link? Using results from a survey experiment with over 1,600 bureaucrats in Ghana, we argue that bureaucrats are likely to contribute to this manifestation of the resource curse, but only if they are "disgruntled" in their jobs. More specifically, when primed with information about government oil revenue, bureaucrats who feel underpaid and/or are not included in government patronage networks are more likely to express a willingness to delay responses to taxpayer requests. The findings suggest that ameliorating work conditions for civil servants could mitigate the adverse effects of natural resource revenue on government accountability to citizens.

Authors

• Rachel Sigman, Naval Postgraduate School

• Adam Harris, University College London

• Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, University of Nottingham

• Kim Sass Mikkelsen, Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University

• Christian Schuster, University College London