The (Non-)Implementation of Incentive Schemes: 30 Years of Civil Service Reforms

• In Event: Frontiers of Research on Bureaucratic Politics and Management Mini-Conference: Discretion, Incentives, and Effectiveness

Abstract

Many public sector reforms in Africa have sought to improve efficiency by linking civil servants’ performance to incentives. However, there is relatively little systematic evidence about the design, implementation, and effectiveness of these performance management reforms. We address this gap by documenting the patterns of all performance-oriented civil service reform since 1990 in Ghana and Zambia. We compile timelines and details of over two dozen reforms through 60 interviews with civil servants in each country and an extensive review of project reports, academic studies and government archives, including multiple efforts to implement incentivized annual appraisal and performance contract systems in each country. The pattern revealed is stark: there are no examples of governments successfully linking individual performance to meaningful rewards or sanctions. However, we also highlight ways in which some of these schemes have achieved positive results through measurement and dialogue - even in the absence of hard incentives - and discuss implications for the design of future performance management reforms. We relate this to recent microeconomic evidence on the use of monitoring and incentives in the public sector, as well as evidence from public administration research in OECD countries.

Authors

• Martin J. Williams, University of Oxford

• Liah Yecalo-Tecle