The Deliberative Constitution: Deliberative Democracy in Denmark’s 1848 Constituent Assembly

• In Event: How Elites Destabilize Democracies: Evidence from 19th Century Europe

Abstract

The creation of professional and political associations for citizens is often essential for democratization, yet prior studies have also demonstrated that there can be a ``dark side” of social capital (Berman 1997, Satyanath et al 2013, Shefter 1994). In particular, elites can capture local mobilization and use this electoral power for anti-democratic ends. Here, I study this phenomenon at the local level in the French Third Republic. Using unique micro-level data on the first political associations in France, when they were legalized in 1901, I demonstrate the importance of intergroup competition to prevent political capture in the period from 1881-1910. I show that political associations could be captured by local notables and depress political activity, and find that healthy electoral competition exists only when at least two political associations were formed.

Authors

• Alexandra Cirone, Cornell University

• Brenda Van Coppenolle, University of Essex