Why Don't the Poor Rebel? Evidence From the Expropriation of Princes in Germany

• In Event: How Elites Destabilize Democracies: Evidence from 19th Century Europe

Abstract

Foundational models of democratization stipulate that elites extend the franchise in order to preempt a rebellion by the poor. Why, then, is rebellion such a rare event? We draw on historic evidence from Prussia, which was characterized by pronounced variation in the degree to which peasants were enslaved or granted autonomy. In 1926, the newly democratized Weimar Republic organized a referendum whether aristocrats should be expropriated. We show that support for expropriation is negatively correlated with peasant enslavement: Areas plagued by strict feudalism were less likely to vote for the expropriation of aristocrats -- despite the fact that aristocrats had already lost their farms in 1919. To make sense of this counterintuitive result, we draw on historic evidence and qualitative interviews. We argue that the result cannot be explained on economic grounds. Rather, landed elites propagated a belief that society's structure was "naturally" hierarchical. The evidence questions the likelihood of rebellions and sheds light on the means through which elites defend their position in society.

Authors

• Anselm Hager, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

• Nils Redeker, The Hertie School

• Jonas Markgraf, University of Oxford