Persuasion, Coercion, and Force: Introducing the Rebel Recruitment Dataset

• In Event: Rebel Group Organization and Formation

Abstract

There is an extensive body of literature that examines how armed non-state actors recruit civilians. Much of this scholarly work focuses on the role of material and ideological appeals, social networks, and coercion and force in the recruitment of combatants. The conventional wisdom holds that the decisions of which recruitment tactics to use have significant implications for armed groups as such methods influence the quality of recruits. However, there is currently a lack of data on the recruitment practices of a large cross-section of groups, making it difficult to test the variety of implications that stem from theories about armed group recruitment. To remedy this, I gather data on a variety of recruitment practices for all non-state armed groups involved in intrastate conflicts that are in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Database from 1989-2011. These variables include the types of ideological appeals, material appeals, social networks, and types of coercion and force employed by rebel groups for recruitment. To highlight the usefulness of these data, I test whether recruitment tactics affect group outcomes. In line with the conventional wisdom, I find that groups that rely on material recruitment appeals more than ideological ones are less likely to achieve negotiated settlements or outright victory than rebel groups that focus more on ideologically-based recruitment.

Author

• Michael James Soules, Pennsylvania State University