Transparency for Authoritarian Governance and Control

• In Event: Poster Session: Political Dynamics of Communist and Post-Communist Countries

Abstract

Why does a government, especially an authoritarian one, disclose performance information to citizens? The works by Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland show that the disclosure increases chance of collective actions and may lead the regime to collapse. Using a new dataset of local government website transparency, I explore how the Chinese government has been dealing with threat to regime stability through transparency. I argue that authoritarian governments can improve transparency for reducing protests that could cause instability, by directing and facilitating citizens to seek legal and peaceful channels to solve disputes. Specifically, higher local transparency is correlated with less protests but more legal disputes. I also explore the effect of local transparency on petitions to check the mechanism. This story contradicts with the HRV theory that transparency could increase protests and threaten regime survival. With a difference-in-difference strategy, I also show that transparency can be enforced at the local level through governmental agent selection system. The study sheds light on the incentives for authoritarian government’s incentive for transparency as well as informational strategies for governance and political control.

Author

• Handi Li, Emory University