Divided Parties and Elections

• In Event: Intra-Party Competition and Elections

Abstract

Within a party, different groups want different things. Yet, they also have incentives to work together against opposing parties. We study this strategic tension in an electoral context by analyzing a model of electoral contests between parties composed of distinct factions. Factions compete within their party to influence candidate selection but can work together afterward during the general election. We study how endogenous intraparty unity depends on various political conditions and institutions. For example, we characterize how term limits shape the dynamics of intraparty unity. Within the incumbent’s party, endogenous unity creates an endogenous incumbency advantage that grows as the incumbent approaches the final term. We also show that strong factions benefit from party division and prefer to have a more extreme minority faction. Candidate selection is more divisive, but higher overall party effort in the general election can outweigh that cost.

Authors

• Gleason Judd, Princeton University

• Sergio J Ascencio, University of Essex