Security Hierarchy and the Initiation and Escalation of Territorial Claims

• In Event: Territorial Disputes

Abstract

This article examines how embeddedness within the global security hierarchy impacts the onset and management of territorial disputes. I argue that submission to a dominant state provides security to subordinates. I highlight two mechanisms: subordinate constraint and general deterrence. First, subordinate states must cede foreign policy discretion in return for security support from the dominant state. If the dominant power has a status quo-bias, this should lead subordinate states to refrain from issuing challenges over territory and from utilizing violent management strategies that risk dominant power involvement. Second, subordination is a costly signal to outside viewers that the state is relatively certain the dominant power will intervene on its behalf if its security is threatened. If the probability is high enough and the costs imposing enough, the shadow of the dominant power ought to keep states from targeting subordinates in their disputes. Using data on subordination to the US and issue disputes (Issue Correlates of War), I demonstrate that subordination does constrain the onset and violent management of territorial disputes, but do not find support for a general deterrence effect. Instead, deterrence depends on where the both the challenger and target are in the hierarchy. I show that disputes involving targets that are relatively higher up in the hierarchy than the challenger rarely militarize. This study highlights the need for a more nuanced approach concerning how a major power can guarantee the security of its subordinates.

Author

• Cody Joseph Schmidt, University of Iowa