A Certain Gamble: Preferences and Institutions in Rivalry Termination

• In Event: Poster Session: Conflict Processes II

Abstract

In this article I introduce a new measure of rivalry termination and a new explanation of
the link between domestic political change in one state and the termination of long standing
rivalry between that state and others. I argue that changes in leadership, policy or winning
coalitions within one rival represents political instability rather than fundamental change in
the relationship. This instability places the leadership of the other state in a domain of
gains, thus motivating risk-aversion and reducing the likelihood that they will accept the
risky gamble of attempted dispute resolution with a rival. However, change in the
fundamental institutions that govern leadership selection and policy formation in one rival
provides a far higher degree of certainty to the opposing state that a fundamental change in
their relationship is possible. This certainty of additional gains that could be had through
resolution of conflicts with a rival overcomes risk aversion and promotes conflict resolution.

Author

• Richard Saunders, Florida State University