Compliant Courts: The Logic of Judicial Appointments and Autocratic Stability

• In Event: Politics and Mechanisms of Authoritarian Regime Durability

Abstract

One of the most enduring legacies of colonial rule in Africa has been in the legal sector. Across the continent, contemporary legal and judicial institutions continue to engender repressive outcomes that were originally established during the colonial era. However, the degree to which African autocrats chose to maintain these repressive systems — and the extent to which they helped fortify and sustain autocratic rule across the continent — remains underexplored. Using recently declassified records on decolonization and Overseas Development Assistance in former British Africa, this paper examines how African autocrats strategically chose to appoint British subjects over indigenous Africans because doing so helped foster judicial subservience to autocratic rule. While existing scholarship tends to highlight the importance of packing the bench with partisan cronies, I argue that in the one-party and military dictatorships of former British Africa, ensuring a regular rotation of expatriate agents was a more reliable way of constraining courts because it effectively insulated judges from local conflicts (who never stayed anywhere long enough to develop strong partisan loyalties) and fostered dependence on the executive (since it was the latter who controls their location and tenure). These findings suggest that the enduring legacies of colonial institutions in postcolonial courts was often a deliberate, strategic continuation of practices that helped fortify and consolidate authoritarian rule.

Author

• Fiona Shen-Bayh, William & Mary