Core Interest, Crisis Behavior, Reputation

• In Event: Formal Models of International Conflict

Abstract

Does fighting in a crisis signal information about a Challenger’s resolve to fight, or aggressive long-term intentions, or is there too much uncertainty to signal anything at all? I develop a model of repeated crises where Challengers have competing incentives to both under-state and over-state their motives because Defenders have different opportunities to wield force. I show that the predictions of the security dilemma literature and the literature on the reputation for resolve to fight are driven by these different threats. Thus, the predictions of these frameworks will vary depending on which threat of force is most salient. I then argue that pre-crisis foreign policy context --- whether an issue under dispute is consistent or inconsistent with the challenger's declared core interests --- determines which threat of force is salient. When a crisis erupts over a declared core interest, Defenders threaten to mobilize in a crisis. If the Challenger fights, Defenders infer that they are highly resolved to fight for core interests. If a crisis erupts over a declared peripheral interest, Defenders threaten major war that prevents future crises from materializing. If the Challenger fights, Defenders infer that the Challenger holds aggressive long term motives and will fight whenever the opportunity presents itself. I show the model’s predictions can explain contradictory empirical findings on crisis behavior and reputation.

Author

• Michael Frederick Joseph, George Washington University