China's Great Red Fleet

• In Event: Provocation, Escalation, and Duration

Abstract

When does naval diplomacy support a rising power’s interests and when does it invite balancing? This study argues that naval diplomacy typically fails when domestic politics compel the state to deploy it before the rising state’s power is sufficient to deter interference from other great powers. Using an original dataset of port visits by roughly 1000 individual People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships, the paper examines whether naval diplomacy from 1998 to 2018 served Beijing’s core interests—domestic support, reunification with Taiwan, South China Sea disputes, and economic development— or whether these ship visits were associated with increased likelihood of regional balancing and conflict with the United States. The findings indicate that while naval diplomacy was initially successful in supporting China’s strategy of reassurance, a shift in 2008 has invited greater balancing worldwide. This topic has implications for China’s foreign policy and its growing maritime rivalry with the United States.

Author

• John Robinson, University of Virginia