The Life of Laws: Political Uncertainty, Rulemaking, and Regulatory Regimes

• In Event: Regulation and Rulemaking

Abstract

Under what conditions does a law create fast- versus slow-moving regulatory regimes? And when does a law create long-lasting versus short-lived regulatory opportunities for agencies? In this paper, we develop and test a model of how bureaucratic discretion, political context, policy uncertainty, and the costliness of rule production alter incentives for bureaucratic rulemaking pursuant to those laws. We argue that political and production risks impact agency uncertainty and the timing of rule promulgation. Once a law is enacted, uncertainty varies as governing coalitions enter and exit political institutions. Because the ideological composition of these coalitions changes over time, so does the ideological alignment with agencies responsible for implementation and rulemaking, calibrating bureaucratic expectations regarding the degree of legislative oversight and potential rule production costs. Additionally, variation in political uncertainty over time influences bureaucratic strategies, increasing or decreasing the volume and velocity of rulemaking. As such, we examine all federal regulatory activity from 1981-2018 pursuant to significant federal legislative enactments from 1947-2018.

Authors

• Pamela Clouser McCann, University of Southern California

• Nicholas G. Napolio, University of Southern California

• Jordan Carr Peterson, North Carolina State University