Public Diplomacy, Foreign Support and Negotiations in Civil War

• In Event: Peace Negotiations and Post-Conflict Transitions

Abstract

While numerous studies explore the material consequences of foreign interventions in civil wars, fewer consider how the expectation of intervention may shape the behavior of the combatants. Some qualitative and policy-focused work has suggested that the possibility of an intervention may create a situation of moral hazard---incentivizing riskier behavior on the part of combatants who anticipate that foreign actors will shield them from losses. We attempt to empirically assess this claim by leveraging the efforts of governments involved in civil wars to achieve direct, unfiltered communication with the foreign public and elites to promote a narrative favorable to themselves---that is, to engage in public diplomacy campaigns (PDCs) in the US. When governments engaged in civil wars reach out to foreign publics and elites directly to share their point of view, we contend they may become emboldened, calculating that external support is more likely. Under these conditions, such governments may confront a situation of moral hazard in which they will be incentivized to offer fewer concessions to rebels in negotiations than would otherwise be the case, in anticipation of future material support. To test this claim, we collect data PDCs in the US following the Cold War. We then analyze the impact of government PDCs on the likelihood that the conflict will end via negotiations. Our findings echo our theoretical intuition, and carry important implications for studies of foreign interventions, civil war termination, and studies of human rights norms and institutions.

Authors

• Benjamin Thomas Jones, The University of Mississippi

• Eleonora Mattiacci, Amherst College