The Role of Lobbying and Elections in Shaping Unequal Representation

• In Event: How the Rich Control Government

Abstract

What explains income-based inequality in policy responsiveness by elected officials in contemporary democracies in North America and Europe? The strength of interest groups, whether mass-based groups like unions or organizations representing business interests, is commonly presented as a crucial causal factor. However, it is not clear whether they select or affect political equality in policymaking.
In this paper, we make two arguments. First, we show theoretically that selection and influence are likely to be empirically bundled, thus challenging existing empirical approaches. Second, we develop a new empirical strategy to analyze their respective impact.
We use a simple game-theoretic model to show that electoral selection and post-electoral influence are likely complements, and not substitutes. They are thus expected to covary in any given dataset, making it challenging to unbundle their effects empirically. Furthermore, because data on electoral selection is more easily observable, researchers may wrongly conclude that this is the main or only relevant mechanism.

Authors

• Michael Becher, IE School of Global and Public Affairs

• Daniel Stegmueller, Duke University