The Political Economy of NGO Service Delivery: Evidence from a Field Experiment

• In Event: Field Experiments on Service Delivery and Accountability

Abstract

In Western political philosophy, the provision of public services has been the bedrock for theories about the ties that bind citizens to the state. In addition to the importance of service delivery for poverty reduction, human development, and economic growth, contemporary political economy views government provision of services as both a core driver of political engagement and as a key factor by which citizens judge the performance of politicians and government.

While the importance of service provision has been a central topic in political economy, there has been far less investigation into the political effects of service provision by non-state actors. Despite a long history, the impact of non-state service delivery in Africa has new relevance due to the rise of development NGOs. Since the 1990s, service delivery by NGOs in the developing world has undergone explosive growth, due in large part to dramatic increases in international aid and philanthropy received by these organizations.

Research highlighting the instrumental origins of political accountability suggests that NGO service delivery could make citizens feel less reliant on government and undermine incentives to remain politically engaged. Alternatively, recent work on political credit attribution suggests that government actors, and especially political executives, often receive credit for outcomes, policies, and programs that they are not responsible for. In this paper, I argue that NGO service delivery lets unresponsive leaders “off the hook” for service provision by creating a preference for NGO-provided services over government services, while also generating political credit for powerful government actors that are seen as controlling access to NGO services. Rather than seeing NGOs as substitutes for the state, citizens see NGO services as a valuable resource controlled by powerful government actors, and they reward these powerful government actors for increases in access to NGO services.

Using a highly effective, randomized community health worker intervention implemented across all four regions of Uganda, I investigate the political economy effects of receiving access to NGO health services that can substitute for similar government services. Critically, this community health worker intervention was implemented parallel to a similar government program in Uganda, allowing respondents to directly compare the quality of government and NGO provided services.

Using behavioral and attitudinal measures, I do not find evidence that the intervention reduced levels of political engagement. However, I do find strong behavioral and attitudinal evidence that the intervention increased citizens' preference for NGOs to provide a larger share of health service in the country relative to government. I also find that respondents see the incumbent President as having power over the allocation of NGO services and that receiving access to NGO services improved perceptions of the president’s job performance. I do not find evidence that receiving NGO services had an impact on government investments in health services, education services, or infrastructure.

These results suggest that donors face a tradeoff in channeling development assistance through NGOs. While NGOs interventions are often highly effective at improving citizen welfare, NGO service delivery may also create preferences for NGO service provision over government provision while generating political credit for governments that under-invest in service delivery. The findings have implications for development aid policy, effective philanthropy practices, and social policy in developing countries.

Author

• Jeremy Springman, Duke University