How Black Criminality Affects Plea Bargaining

• In Event: Formal Theories of Violence and Extremism

Abstract

This paper formalizes the often-secretive bureaucratic process of plea bargaining with a focus on race and shocks to the criminal justice system itself. The key outputs of this model are in articulating why plea bargains are so prevalent, and why we see a plethora of innocent people accepting plea bargains, and specifically what ways the race of the defendant affects the strategies available. By operationalizing theories of race and criminality by authors such as Khalil Muhammad and Lisa Marie Cacho, this model articulates the way racialized views of criminality lead to equilibria that are distinct by race with expected outcomes being lower for that of a black defendant. These differences lead to defendants of color receiving higher sentences in plea agreements and being more likely to agree to a plea when innocent due to the way they are perceived by the court. Extensions of these models show the way changes to the criminal justice system will affect plea bargains. Elimination of cash bail or mandatory minimums can have a positive effect on the side of the defendant. However, this model shows that, while these programs are designed and implemented to address inequalities and unfairness, they do not address the way criminality is racialized and therefore the discrepancy between the defendants across race will remain in the plea-bargaining system.

Author

• Bianca Elizabeth DiGiovanni