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The assassination of social movement leaders in post-conflict Colombia has been one of the most visible setbacks of the implementation of the recent peace agreement. Some state officials have dismissed the systematicity of this violence or denied its political nature. While violence against social movement leaders is systematic and driven (partially) by political factors, it does not appear to be the result of top-down state repression, but rather reflects the complex interaction between state agents, local elites, and non-state armed (and often criminal) actors in the construction and preservation of local political orders. Building on quantitative evidence, in this paper we explore how violence against social leaders results from two distinct pathways: collusion between local state and non-state armed actors to create local political orders or competition between these actors for local hegemony. For each pathway, we reflect on the consequences for the type and intensity of violence against social movement activists. To build our theory of post-conflict political violence, we conduct process-tracing based on extensive fieldwork of three cases: Tumaco, North of Cauca and Lower Cauca regions in Colombia. While empirically restricted to Colombia, our study provides valuable insights about the links between state and non-state actors in the construction of local orders, the provision of governance, and the use of violence against social movements.