Domestic Freedom and Foreign Despotism: J.S. Mill's Philosophy of Colonialism

• In Event: Poster Session: Foundations of Political Theory I

Abstract

John Stuart Mill’s exclusion of uncivilized peoples from the harm principle is often characterized as squarely at odds with his defence of individual liberty and autonomy. He is accused of lifting the value of historical progress above the qualities and capacities of the individual. A civilizational binary is established prior to any assessment of individuals’ capacity to live freely. Much of the work on Mill and empire that has pursued his line of thinking is subtle, persuasive and rich in insights. It has put Mill’s views about empire in context, greatly expanding our understanding of the East India Company’s influence on Mill’s thought and shedding light on the wider debates about imperialism taking place in Victorian Britain. The ‘Empire Studies’ literature, as it is sometimes called, has also exposed the many weaknesses of Mill’s defense of imperialism. It has largely misunderstood, however, the link between Mill’s imperialism and his larger political project, and has therefore not connected his defence of empire to the core principles that he defends in his most famous works, such as On Liberty and Utilitarianism. In this paper, I will argue that there are crucial parallels between Mill’s account of domestic freedom and his defense of imperialism. To do this, I focus on the analogy that Mill draws between uncivilized peoples and children. This analogy draws on a long tradition of portraying colonized peoples as childlike, but it also does philosophical work for Mill. He thinks that autonomy is not valuable for children and for colonized people, and that this is so for the same reason in both cases. In making this argument, I offer a reading of On Liberty as a text that is deeply concerned with imperial despotism, as well as with domestic freedom. In laying out his defense of the harm principle and the doctrine of liberty, Mill was also describing the kind of person who would benefit from these two cornerstones of his liberalism, and the kind of society that was required in order for them to be beneficial at all. Those individuals and societies who do not have the capacities and experience that Mill thinks are required in order for his views to be beneficial can be ruled despotically.

Children and the members of uncivilized peoples lack the capacity to make choices that develop their individuality. Children, due to their young age and lack of mental powers, do not have the experience and the cognitive capacity to reflect on what life choices will be most helpful for their development. Members of uncivilized peoples live under social conditions that deprive them of the ability to make genuine choices at all. They lack experience, because those around them are similarly deprived, and they are trained to think only in terms of custom.

Mill’s analogy between children and colonized people suggests a potential difference between his domestic and international politics. Mill’s domestic anti-paternalism, as expressed in On Liberty and other writings, applies at the individual level. Each adult individual in British society has a right against paternalistic intervention in her affairs and is granted a substantial sphere of liberty. At the international level, however, Mill thinks of anti-paternalism at the level of whole societies. In order to be protected from foreign interference and despotic rule by the harm principle, foreign societies must be civilized. A major aim of this paper is to show that the individual and societal applications of the harm principle and the doctrine of liberty are in fact part of a single account of autonomy that Mill elaborates and therefore do not indicate a discontinuity between Mill’s domestic and international politics. In order to make this case, I emphasize the role of custom in Mill’s defense of imperialism. On his account, societies that are ruled by custom can be justifiably colonized because custom is a social force that prevents individuals from benefiting from democracy and a substantial sphere of individual liberty. Custom is a force that operates at the level of whole societies, but affects the lives of the individuals within these societies. Children and uncivilized peoples, due to lack of experience and cognitive limits on their choice-making capacities (naturally imposed for the former, socially imposed for the latter) cannot benefit from the harm principle, because their free choices are not choices properly understood. These ‘choices’ do not help them develop their individuality or lead lives that are conducive to happiness. Individuals in societies that are not ruled by custom might also fail to make choices that develop their individuality, but their ability to make those choices freely is nonetheless worth protecting because such choices will help them develop their capacity to make better choices in the future. In societies that are ruled by custom, individuals do not make genuine choices at all, they merely mimic others.

Author

• Theophile Deslauriers, Princeton University