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Citizens in many cities of the developing world struggle to access state services. Instead, they rely on services that are provided informally or illegally. Such ‘off the grid’ services tend to be intermittent, expensive, and of low quality. Their existence undercuts the fiscal contract between citizens and states. This phenomenon raises two key questions. First, what prevents poorer citizens from getting on the grid and accessing public services to which they are legally entitled? Second, how does transitioning into formal, state service provision affect political attitudes and behaviors? To address these questions, we develop a theoretical framework focusing on the incentives of three key actors that play an important role in formalizing public services: bureaucrats, politicians and citizens. To test the theory, we conduct a large-scale cluster randomized control trial in Mumbai, India involving close to 7000 households across 152 informal settlement clusters throughout the city. Partnering with local NGOs, we assess how two types of interventions—bureaucratic assistance, and political pressure in the form of group voice—shape communities’ likelihood of of securing municipal water connections, and thus formalized water supply. We then leverage these encouragements to estimate downstream impacts. Results based on analysis of data from our midline survey shed light on the constraints to public service formalization in the developing world.
Nikhar Gaikwad, Columbia University
Gareth Nellis, University of California, San Diego
Anjali Thomas, Georgia Institute of Technology