Can Deep Engagement Make Rules? The Struggles of Post-Cold War Export Controls

• In Event: Choose Your Weapon: Political Economy Approaches to Arming

Abstract

Hegemonic stability theory suggests that powerful countries must exercise leadership, whether through carrots or sticks, to create a stable international order. Advocates of the grand strategy of deep engagement argue that the post-Cold War United States had special advantages in doing so, whether because of its dominant power, its ability to offer (or withhold) economic inducements, or its ability to reassure partners because of its liberalism. As Mastanduno explained for the Cold War, export controls offer a particular acute test of the hegemon’s ability to make rules to preserve the order, especially regarding the transfer of military-related technology to a potential challenger. Building on the Cold War challenges to the theory and strategy, our empirical study of the the post-Cold War failures of U.S. export controls, especially regarding China, show that hegemony and deep engagement do not work the way their advocates think that they should. Allies have worked to circumvent U.S. export controls, the U.S. has hurt its ability to maintain its military edge vis-à-vis China as it enforces export controls on itself, and ultimately U.S. policymakers themselves worked to loosen U.S. export controls as China’s power and military potential increased.

Author

• Charles Eugene Gholz, University of Notre Dame