Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Shifts in the distribution of power and technological change have given rise to a new complexity in international organization. In a dynamic international system, states are reluctant to accept lock-in through formal institutions. At the same time, progress in transportation and communication technologies has created new options for the design of cooperative arrangements. In contrast to traditional hub-and-spokes organizations, technology facilitates Informal Cooperation Architectures (ICAs): decentralized arrangements that cut out the treaty-based organizational middle-man and integrate political summitry with cross-border bureaucratic working groups. The ICA scheme has proliferated widely and forms the backbone of both bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts like the G-groups. How do ICAs operate and take shape? I argue that their decentralized character requires a shift from organizational to architectural design thinking. I model ICAs as the product of repeated institutional choices unfolding vertically (across government levels) and horizontally (between states). I conduct a first plausibility test by tracing institutional choices in two prominent ICAs: the bilateral architecture between Germany and China and the multilateral architecture underlying the G-20. I conclude by highlighting the asynchronicity of rapid technological advances and entrenched government structures as a key challenge for architectural design.