Appeasing Allies: State Responses to Terror Threats in Sub-Saharan Africa

• In Event: Poster Session: Conflict Processes I

Abstract

Since 9/11, African governments have demonstrated considerable variation in their responses to violent, insurgent or "terrorist" activity. State responses to armed groups such as Boko Haram or Al-Shabab show that government responses rarely correspond to military capacity or to the scale and frequency of attacks. Moreover, variation persists in the ways in which terror attacks are framed to the general public, as well as in the deployment of resources and state security forces.
Both within and across countries, government responses have varied both spatially and temporally. In Nigeria, for example, President Buhari at times ignored the crisis in the north, and at other times deployed state police and military to conduct mass arrests in affected areas. Ex-President Jonathan, on the other hand, consistently failed to respond to Boko Haram’s activities, even when attacks garnered widespread publicity and international pressure. In Kenya, attacks in Garissa or the North provoke very different government reactions to attacks on the coast or, for instance, in the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. What explains this variation? How should we make sense of divergent government responses to insurgent or violent activity? And what can this variation tell us about the broader landscape of security policy in sub-Saharan Africa?
Speaking to a lacuna in the literature on government responses to insurgent violence in sub-Saharan Africa, I propose a theory of electoral instrumentalism. I argue that the timing of the attack (in terms of the volatility of the president and proximity to a competitive election), and the physical location of the attack (the extent to which the ruling party relies on affected areas for electoral support) are key determinants of a state’s political response. Through an analysis of within-state variation in responses to acts of violence in Nigeria and Kenya between 2010 and 2016, I show the significance of whether or not the targets of an attack and their ensuing demands for a robust state response constitute a core support base for the ruling party.
The electoral vulnerability of the government, which can be understood along a continuum, further explains variation and nuance in both discursive and military responsiveness. Given that these factors change over time and with political transitions, examining state responses with attention to the security of the President and / or the proportion and strength of the governing coalition, helps us understand episodic engagement by governments facing so-called terror threats. By way of example, President Buhari relied heavily on supporters in the north (and particularly in areas affected by Boko Haram attacks), thus incentivizing a more robust political response than his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathon whose support base drew primarily from the south. Such patterns reflect a longstanding history of regional distributive politics in Nigeria. I show that similar patterns play out in Kenya, Cameroon and elsewhere.

Author

• Jemima Ackah-Arthur, London School of Economics and Political Science