Discerning Domination Through Civil-Military Relations: A Probabilistic Approach

• In Event: Poster Session: Democracy & Autocracy

Abstract

On January 28th, 2011, pro-army slogans erupted in Midan Al-Tahrir as the Egyptian military officially announced its refusal to attack protesters (Ketchley 2014). With the military’s acquiescence, the Egyptian people succeeded in overthrowing their dictatorship in pursuit of democracy and its promise of freedom. But midway through Egypt’s first rocky experiment with democracy, the military seized power from the new civilian government and carried out the bloodiest massacre in modern Egyptian history (Barany 2011; Springborg 2013; Brooks 2019).

It seems strange that the same military that was once committed to protecting protesters would later abandon that commitment and brutally oust a democratically-elected civilian government. How can we know that any military—in the United States, for instance—will not carry out a military coup in the same way, given their undeniable capacity for violence? Some might point to the law as a binding constraint—but the coup in Egypt was illegal. Others might point to internal commitments like virtue or professionalization—but as the example illustrates, professed commitments can change. Notwithstanding stringent civilian control, “any military strong enough to protect civilian society is also strong enough to destroy it” (Feaver 1999, 220).

The example raises an important tension inherent in many asymmetrical power structures deemed necessary for social and political life. Objectionable power asymmetries are everywhere, and even the best democracies with a unique claim to legitimacy by way of consent are not immune. How, then, can we know which asymmetrical power arrangements are objectionable and which are not in the face of deep uncertainty? And even if we can make those abstract distinctions, how can we be sure that any legitimate authority serving a normatively valuable political end will not use its power illegitimately, especially when such a capacity persists?

In spite of the rapid growth of the normative scholarship on domination and subordination in recent years, virtually none have addressed the practical concerns presented by the civil-military relations problematique (Feaver 2003; Brooks 2019). Part I of the paper identifies problems in accounts that define objectionable power dichotomously—making them prone to either false positives (Pettit 1997; 2012; Lukes 2005; Lovett 2010) or false negatives (Shapiro 2012; 2016; Friedman 2008; Blunt 2015; McCammon 2015). Even the accounts that have taken note of these concerns such as Kolodny (2019) and Simpson (2017) have not developed a viable alternative. This paper seeks to develop a theoretical framework that takes probability seriously and addresses the concerns of power endured under actual, non-ideal conditions.

Using the military case-study illustratively, Part II unpacks the power dynamics involved in the two paradigms in question: the “benevolent dictator,” and the “legitimate authority.” From the analyses, two reconciliatory propositions emerge: 1) “benevolent dictator” power dynamics may be less objectionable for the purpose of serving as a necessary “legitimate authority”; and 2) “legitimate authority” power dynamics may be more objectionable to the extent that that they mirror “benevolent dictator” power dynamics. We can make these judgements by considering the likelihood that that power-bearers will actually misuse the power they hold over others.

Part III develops a probabilistic approach that draws on the logic of “second-best” theories, considers relevant social and political trends along with the psychological and sociological processes underlying them, and explores the role of institutions in increasing reliability (Wiens 2012; Lipsey & Lancaster 1956; Margalit 1983; Knight & Johnson 1999; Shklar 1989). Compelling evidence stacked on the side of probability indicates potential for effective ex ante prevention while minimizing the chances of producing false positives. This framework is useful for anticipating some of the most pervasive but invisible forms of objectionable power on the basis of imminence, urgency, and likelihood. Using both the empirical and normative tools at our disposal, better assessments of actual conditions can be made according to their next best attainable aims.

Making progress towards the kinds of solutions that our normative theories prescribe requires that the philosophical reflections underlying them are situated within a view to the actual social and political conditions they describe. The literature on civil-military relations shows the promising potential of this probabilistic approach in distinguishing between more and less objectionable cases. However, the value of this framework extends well beyond the military example. Though still a work in progress, this paper seeks to expand its scope beyond civil-military relations to aid assessments of social and political contexts fitting similar power paradigms.

Author

• Somia M. Youssef, Duke University