The Authoritarian Logic of Covert Information Control

• In Event: Democracy, Autocracy and the Internet

Abstract

Information control in China takes many forms: censorship, astroturfing, intimidation of content producers/"thought leaders," and state regulation of the media. Though we know a great deal about how information control tactics are deployed, there are two large gaps in our understanding of the effects of information control tactics on those who experience them. First, it is unclear if and how each information control tactic may or may not be effective. Second, it is unclear how recognizability of information control tactics to those who experience them (covertness/overtness) affect the degree to which they are effective. To answer these questions, I use three survey experiments that present subjects with a custom-engineered news website and an article interface that simulates three of the most common types of information control in China. I measure the effectiveness of each of these three tactics in overt and covert forms using behavioral analytics, open-ended responses, and survey scales. I find that additive and subtractive information control conditions significantly decrease perceptions of discourse competition. I, however, do not find evidence that perceptions of discourse competition increased or decreased the effectiveness of information control. Instead, I find those experiencing subtractive information control and overt suppressive information control perceive discourse as more representativene of society at large. As expected, the credible representativeness of this discourse leads to greater degrees of effectiveness of these information control tactics. Finally, I find some supportive evidence that overt information control can result in poor user experience, suggesting that private media companies have a stake in keeping information control covert. This work gives us a better idea of if and how information control tactics can be effective and measures the causal effect of covert information control on its effectiveness.

Author

• Blake Miller, London School of Economics and Political Science