Regime Complexity and Overlapping Information: Evidence from Energy Forecasts

• In Event: The Politics of Institutional Choice

Abstract

One of the key functions for international organizations (IO) is to provide information. However, IOs do not always transmit the information they have. How does the existence of competitors, as characterized by today's overlapping institutions, affect IO's function to provide information? While studies of regime complexity have debated whether overlapping institutions encourage or hinder better rule-making and compliance, this paper looks at a less-studied aspect of this consequence: IO's role as information provider. I develop a formal model to argue that the entry of additional IO helps motivate the incumbent IOs to reveal more information when the information is verifiable type. However, there are also cases where overlapping institutions hinder information transmission. If the information is less verifiable type, additional IO may not help truthful revelation by incumbent IOs, as it creates competition among IOs over support from domestic actors. I empirically illustrate this with the case of overlapping institutions providing energy projections. Using an originally collected data of energy policy publications and difference-in-differences design, I demonstrate how projections provided by existing IOs are influenced by the entry of new IOs.

Author

• Sayumi Miyano, Princeton University