Transparency, a Double-edged Sword for International Bureaucrats

• In Event: Democracy, Accountability, and International Organizations

Abstract

International organizations have become more transparent in recent years. For instance, interest groups, the media, and the public can observe and otherwise attend meetings. This increased transparency is a response to increased public demands for democratic accountability. This paper examines the costs and benefits of transparency for international organizations. In particular, transparency offers opportunities for international bureaucrats to publicize their efforts and justify the activities of their organization, but it also limits their ability to effectively mediate conflict among member states. While the scholarship on transparency focuses on the willingness of member states to deal, this project emphasizes the interests of career-minded international bureaucrats in maintaining a reputation for unbiasedness. If mediation involves favoring one side or another, public mediation would signal both competence and bias to potential future employers. International bureaucrats with strong career incentives thereby would underperform as mediators in more transparent organizations. I construct a formal model and test the theoretical predictions with the comparative case study of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the relatively more transparent World Trade Organization (WTO). Consistent with my theoretical prediction, interviewed evidence as well as archival records show that high-ranking GATT/WTO Secretariats avoid otherwise efficient agenda-setting when there is more transparency to avoid the appearance of bias.

Author

• Minju Kim, University of California San Diego