Institutional Gridlock and Democratic Backsliding

• In Event: Poster Session: Democracy & Autocracy

Abstract

Why do people support leaders who remove checks and balances? I argue that aspiring autocrats are more likely to get popular support by presenting checks and balances as obstacles to getting things done, even if abuse of power is a popular concern. In addition to this strategy, aspiring autocrats promise popular policies to signal shared preferences with citizens to convince them to delegate power. An original survey experiment conducted in Turkey supports these arguments. Moreover, respondents perceive an autocrat, who proposes to reduce the power of checks and balances, as more democratic when he justifies his proposal on the grounds of breaking gridlock. The results imply that citizens can perceive a policy-responsive regime without checks and balances as more democratic than a liberal democratic regime due to the possibility of gridlock in the latter, showing the tension between majoritarian and liberal components of democracy.

Author

• Fatih Serkant Adiguzel, Duke University