Signaling Status with Military Weapons: Experimental Evidence

• In Event: Credibility, Signaling, & Coercion

Abstract

Why do states invest in costly weapons like aircraft carriers or fighter jets, even when these weapons offer limited strategic advantages? Previous work suggests that weapons may appeal to buyers because they symbolize desirable qualities. Leaders may use weapons acquisitions to signal status to their domestic audience, who takes on nationalistic pride. We make theoretical and methodological contributions to this discussion. First, our theoretical framework derives observable implications from the literature. We argue that weapons more credibly signal status if they are owned by high-status states, exclusive, costly, and visible. Second, we develop new observable implications about the microfoundations of status-seeking behavior. We argue that status considerations appeal more to people who rank highly on national attachment, self-monitoring, or social dominance orientation. Methodologically, we conduct a conjoint experiment with members of the U.S. public to assess whether status considerations mobilize support for buying fighter jets. The conjoint design allows us to disentangle status from strategic considerations and to simultaneously test multiple observable implications. We expect that people will prefer jets that signal status to those that do not, even after we account for strategic considerations, and that psychological dispositions will moderate the effect of status considerations.

Authors

• Marina Duque, Florida State University

• Kathleen E Powers, Dartmouth College