The Politics of Delegated Authority

• In Event: Claiming, Blaming, and Branding

Abstract

How do electoral concerns influence delegation to bureaucratic agents? Standard theories of delegation assume that ideological conflict and information asymmetries between political principals and their bureaucratic agents dictate delegation decisions. Yet delegated authority may reveal that a principal lacks the expertise to make an informed decision herself. I develop a formal model in which a voter observes whether the principal delegated policymaking authority to a bureaucrat, and either retains or dismisses the principal; the voter prefers to retain only if either the principal is su�ciently expert or, under certain conditions, su�ciently reliant on bureaucratic expertise. This a↵ects the principal’s optimal delegation decision: the principal either under-utilizes bureaucrats to convey expertise or over-utilizes bureaucrats to demonstrate reliance on more moderate bureaucratic capacity. The results suggest a ‘career concerns’ rationale for delegation that runs counter to the normative interpretations of standard models: delegation is not necessarily a concession to superior expertise, while non-delegation is not necessarily a consequence of bureaucratic disloyalty.

Author

• Lindsey Gailmard, California Institute of Technology